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STUDENT NOTES JND RECENT CASES
decedent for a number of years, and while it is not so clear
that this knowledge does not involve a personal transac-
tion or communication, this was held to be sufficient to make
the evidence admissible and make out a prima facie case.
This is a liberal construction of the statute, and the result is
desirable, for the rule laid down in the statute is generally
thought to be unsound and is open to all the arguments
which have done away with the common law rule making
interest a disqualification of all witnesses. WIGMORE on EvI-
DENCE, p. 707, § 578; p. 699, § 576. Virginia has practically
abolished the rule excluding evidence of a personal transac-
tion or communication with a decedent, VIRGINIA CODE (1924)
§ 6208, but § 6209 takes the view that cross examination
alone would not be a sufficient safeguard for the estate of
the decedent, and requires that the witness's sole testimony
be corroborated, and if such witness testify, all entries,
memoranda, and declarations by the decedent relative to
the matter in issue are admissible. While West Virginia
retains the rule, it places upon it. a liberal construction, and
holds that evidence admissible under this liberal construc-
tion makes out a prima facie case, without corroboration.
While no doubt it would be better if the rule were abol-
ished, this liberal construction by the court does not cause
the hardships which would result from a strict construction
of the statute.
-JOSEPH G. CONLEY.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-GARNISHMENT-WHO EXEMPT
THEREFRO.-A, clerk of the county court, died leaving funds
unaccounted for, collected by him but belonging to the
county. His administrator was sued by the county court
and the depositary was garnished. Held, that property in
the hands of the personal representative of the decedent is
not subject to garnishment by the creditors of the estate.
The county is not a preferred creditor. The funds are
not impressed with a trust in its favor. State v. Whyte. M 86
S.. E. 860 (W. Va. 1927).
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The principal ease represents the great weight of author-
ity in this country and suggests the inquiry as to who is
exempt from garnishee process, 12 R. C. L. 814, 28 C. J.
77. In West Virginia it has been held that garnishee
process will not issue against the personal representative of
a decedent, Parker v. Donnally, 4 W. Va. 648; administrator
or debtor of an estate, Brewer v. Hutton, 45 W. Va. 106, 30
S. E. 81; a city collector, Aumann v. Black, 15 W. Va. 773; a
trustee of a bankrupt, M. Weisenfeld & Company v. M.
Migpelhorn, 5 W. Va. 46; county officers, Brown v. Gates,
1.5 W. Va. 131, 160; the debtor of a partnership by an indi-
vidual creditor of one of the partners, Gwyan v. Egbert, 44
W. Va. 79; accord while the firm accounts remain unsettled
and unpaid, Lacy v. Greenlee, 75 W. Va. 517, 84 S. E. 921; a
debtor whose liability is enforceable only in a court of equity,
Swan v. Summers, 19 W. Va. 115; a railroad which has con-
tracted with the defendant debtor and the contract is still
executory and conditions in the contract make it possible
that defendant would have nothing owing him after a pos-
sible indemnification of the railroad, Strauss v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railroad Company, 7 W. Va. 368; the maker of a ne-
gotiable note; an insurance company while it has the op-
tion to rebuild burned property or pay its value; the debt-
or of a sailor for wages while his voyage is incomplete;
the debtor of one contracting to complete work within a
specified time which may not be done, Webster Wagon Com-
pany v. Insurance Company & Peterson, 27 W. Va. 314, 336;
public officers and public corporations, in the instant case
a municipality and its treasurer, even though the city has
directed its treasurer to pay over the funds. The exemption
is on the ground of public policy and cannot be waived.
Leiter v. Fire Engine Company, 86 W. Va. 599, 104 S. E. 56;
Welch Lumber Company v. Carter Brothers, 78 W. Va. 11,
88 S. E. 1034. But special commissioners holding funds
arising out of a chancery cause, which funds have been
decreed to be paid over to the owner, may be garnished.
This on the ground that the funds are no longer in the
hands of the court and there is no longer cause for the
court to be jealous of interference with its processes.
Boylan v. Hines, 62 W. Va. 486, 30 S. E. 81. In jurisdictions
outside West Virginia there are three views as to whether
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public corporations may waive their exemption, viz., (1) the
exemption is jurisdictional and cannot be waived, there-
fore the process is absolutely void, (2) the exemption is for
the benefit of the garnishee and he may waive it, (3) it is
for the benefit of the defendant and cannot be waived
without his consent. 2 A. L. R. 1583n., 28 C. J. 62-3. A
non-resident may not be garnished unless when garnished
he has property of the defendant in his possession within
the state or is bound to pay the defendant money or deliver
to him property within the state. Then he must be per-
sonally served. He cannot accept or waive service or vol-
untarily appear. This also applies to corporations. Penngyl-
vani, Railroad Company v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E.
300. But a railroad chartered in another state but doing bus-
iness in this state is a resident for purposes of garnishment,
though the debt was contracted and payable in another state.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Allen, 58 W. Va. 388,
52 S. E. 465. One having legal custody of property cannot be
garnished. Money, credits and property are in custodia legig
when held, by executors, administrators, guardians and like
quasi officers in their representative and administrative ca-
pacities. Brewer v. Hutton, 45 W. Va. 106, 30 S. E. 81.
Where the legislature empowers one corporation to take
charge of a part of the property and franchise of another
corporation, and is directed to account to an equity court
for its acts, a creditor of the corporation, a part of whose
property is thus taken over, who has issued a fieri facias
against its propery, cannot enforce his claim by process of
garnishment against the corporation so taking charge and its
debtors. Swann v. Summers, 19 W. Va. 115. Foreign cars
cannot be seized under an attachment against the company
owning the cars, so as to defeat the rights under the agree-
ment of the company receiving and entitled to use the cars,
and a garnishment -of the receiving company cannot affect
its rights by reason of its possession of such cars. Wall v.
Norfolk & Western Railway Company, 52 W. Va. 485, 44 S. E.
294. No decree can be had against a garnishee in a suit in
chancery, who is not made a party to the suit and who does
not appear and answer. Chillicothe Oil Company v. Hall, 4
W. Va. 703. A contingent liability is not subject to garn-
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ishment under an order of attachment. Minotti v. Brune,
94 W. Va. 181, 118 S. E. 149.
-ARLOS JACKSON HARBERT.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - POWER TO PROHIBIT POOL
RooMs.-In a recent West Virginia case, a mandamus pro-
ceeding, it was found that the city council, after impartial
examination and consideration had refused to issue to the
relator, a license to operate a certain pool and billiard
room. The reasons for this refusal were that relator had
previously operated a pool room on the location in ques-
tion, such operation not being in conformity with the law;
and that relator had proved himself incapable of conduct-
ing such business in conformity with the law. Held, in
such case, the court will not disturb the discretionary judg-
ment of the council. State ex rel. Smith v. Town of Ravens-
wood et aZ., 140 S. E. 680 (W. Va. 1928).
To remedy defects occasioned by the repeal of an earlier
pertinent statute, ACTS 1919, ch. 102, § 130, in 1921 the fol-
lowing amendment was made to ch. 47, § 28 of the WEST VIR-
GINIA CODE:
"The council of such city, town or village shall have
plenary power and authority therein * * * * to license or
prohibit the operation of pool and billiard rooms, and
maintaining for hire pool and billiard tables, and in
event any such business is licensed, to make and enforce
reasonable ordinances regulating the same." ACTS 1921,
ch. 143.
This amendment expressly confers on the council absolute
power to license or prohibit the operation of pool and bil-
liard rooms. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
"plenary: full, entire, complete, absolute." In two subse-
quent cases the court, without mentioning this statute appar-
ently does away with its effect. State ex rel. Hamriclk v.
County Court of Pocahontas County et al., 92 W. Va. 222, 114
S. E. 519, and 92 W. Va. 618, 115 S. E. 583, 29 A. L. R. 37.
A third case, subsequently decided, while mentioning the stat-
ute, arrives at the same conclusion as the preceding two
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